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ABSTRACT
Sustainable seafood programs have developed and evolved for approximately two
decades as a market-based mechanism to complement the traditional “command and
control” fishery management scheme. In some cases, they have successfully
incentivized

fishmen/fish

farmers

around

the

world

to

implement

more

environmentally sustainable production practices. It is not a perfect system capable of
solving every fishery management issue immediately, but it is unequivocally one of
the most promising mechanisms to slow down the degradation of wild fishery stocks
or reduce environmental impacts from aquaculture, while improving the resilience of
coastal fishery communities. As wild fishery stocks continue to decline, aquaculture
production is becoming the main global seafood source. There is also increased
awareness and importance of environmental impacts and consumer preferences of
farmed seafood.
China is the largest producer and consumer of farmed seafood; thus, aquaculture
sustainability is an important concern of both the Chinese government and its seafood
industry. The promotion of sustainably farmed seafood, however, has not recently
been successful in China. Some reasons could be the ineffectiveness of marketing
strategies and lack of consumer awareness. This dissertation makes use of the welldeveloped Chinese online retail market and an experimental auction to conduct three
studies evaluating the impact of the country of origin, eco-labels, and certification
standards information on consumer preferences for farmed seafood. By incorporating
consumers’ subjective perceptions of quality, food safety, and eco-friendliness, we

were able to allocate consumer willingness to pay (WTP) for a product into basic
product attributes.
Combining three studies draws the following conclusions. Among farmed
seafood products, imported seafood is the Chinese consumers’ first choice when there
is no safety information. With guaranteed food safety, a higher price premium is
generated for domestic farmed seafood, but not for imported. An eco-label does not
generate a price premium in the current market, but consumers are willing to pay for it
as long as they are informed of the public benefits of sustainable certification. Private
and public benefit information, together, can significantly increase consumer WTP for
sustainably farmed seafood, especially regarding safety and eco-friendliness. In sum,
this thesis confirms the significant potential of the sustainably farmed seafood market
in China and suggests seafood producers and retailers participate in sustainable
seafood programs.
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

As the world’s largest seafood producer and consumer, China needs a more
sustainable seafood production system, as well as a more environmentally friendly
seafood market. China has a coastline of 14,500 kilometers (km), a little less than the
19,924 km of the US coastline (CIA 2017). If the offshore islands are included,
China’s coastline increases to 32,000 km, with an Exclusive Economic Zone of
3,880,000 square km (Chen and Zhang 2009). Wide extended continent shelves,
multiple river inputs, and the interaction of cold and warm currents provide China
with rich fishery resources. Historically, China had four major fishing grounds with
more than twenty high-yield species (Chen 2009; Chen 2014). However, after two
decades of heavy exploitation in the 1980s and 1990s, traditional high-yield species,
like little yellow croaker (Pseudosciaena polyactis) and large yellow croaker
(Larimichthys crocea), in Yellow Sea and East China Sea almost became extinct.
Today, most remaining fisheries rely on pelagic species and lower trophic-level fish
like sardines, anchovies, mackerel, crustaceans, and mollusks (Chen 2014). However,
FAO fishery statistics indicate that China has been consistently landing more than 10
million tons (MT) of marine fish, crustaceans, and mollusks since 1995, reaching an
historic production of 15 MT in 2015, accounting for 19% of global catch (FAO
2016). Although China’s marine fishery landings have remained high over the past
decade, there is an obvious trend of decline in fish size and diversity. A recent
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Greenpeace investigation indicates that at least 30% of fish landings in China were at
the juvenile stage or younger; half of which were from non-selective bottom trawlers.
Within those immature fish, 96 of 218 species had considerable economic value if
allowed to mature. In 2014, an estimated 2.22 MT of small-sized marine fish were
ground into fishmeal, and another 4.95 MT were used in aquaculture (Greenpeace
2017). More sustainable fishery production and market systems need to be established
in China to address the issues that lead to the collapsing Chinese inshore fisheries.
Along with the depletion of wild fisheries over the past two decades, China has
experienced a rapidly growing economy and increased seafood demand. From 1995 to
2015, China’s GDP soared from US $734,548 million to US $11,064,664 million (The
World Bank 2017). During the same period, China’s total seafood consumption
increased from 26 to 50 MT, with nearly all of the increase derived from the
aquaculture sector (FAO 2017).
China’s aquaculture has played an extremely important role in supporting its
domestic economy and securing food supplies. The history of aquaculture in China
dates back 3000 years, with Asian carp as the first cultivated species. Marine species
farming, or mariculture, started about 50 years ago. The expansion of mariculture has
flourished over the past decade, as wild stocks gradually started to decline and
domestic seafood demand increased rapidly. Mariculture in China covers a range of
products, including aquatic plants, crustaceans, shellfish, and finfish. Crustaceans have
historically commanded the highest unit price.
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Aquaculture in China has created a series of environmental and social issues that
have been ignored for a long time. One of the biggest problems is due to the use of
wild-stock based fishmeal in aquaculture. China provides more than 50% of world
aquaculture products, but at the same time it has consumed at least one MT of
fishmeal every year since 2000 (Han et al. 2016). Due to the inefficiency of feeding
methods and low conversion ratio for carnivores in aquaculture, a large number of
wild fish were wasted. China needs more sustainably sourced fishmeal and plantbased fishmeal, and fish farmers need to improve their farming practices, like adopting
more accurate feeding techniques. This will help mitigate the intense pressure on
China’s wild fish stocks.
Another issue affecting farmed seafood in China is the overuse of antibiotics. The
pursuit of maximum unit production often leads farmers to intensive ponds or cages
and excessive feeding. Protein residues from fishmeal can heavily contaminate the
water during the summer months and increase the chance of serious disease. Large
amounts of antibiotics are often mixed with fishmeal to prevent disease outbreaks.
Overdosing will not only increase drug residues within the seafood but also damage
the surrounding waters and wetlands through the effluent of wastewater. Fortunately, a
number of Chinese fish farms have already acquired sustainable aquaculture
certifications, such as Best Aquaculture Practices (BAP) and Aquaculture Stewardship
Council (ASC) certification. These producers were initially certified to gain market
access of Western countries like the UK and US, but in the past few years, they
reverted to the Chinese domestic market due to intensified competition in international
markets and increasing demand from the Chinese domestic market.
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To date, a limited number of eco-labeled domestic seafood products can be found
in the Chinese market. Chinese certified producers hesitate to maintain sustainable
standards for the domestic market because they are unsure about Chinese consumer
preferences for these products. The concept of sustainable seafood is relatively new in
China. Although constant efforts have been made by international non-governmental
organizations, seafood companies, and the Chinse government, Chinese consumers
have not responded positively, and market share and the acceptance of sustainable
seafood remains low (Fabinyi 2016).
This dissertation investigates Chinese consumer preferences for sustainably
farmed seafood from an economic point of view using both revealed preference and
stated preference data. The study also provides marketing suggestions and policy
implications to facilitate the promotion of sustainably farmed seafood in China. The
research findings are summarized into three areas. First, seafood safety is the biggest
concern for Chinese consumers. They prefer imported seafood when there is no safety
information provided. However, when they have guaranteed safety, they select
domestic seafood. Meanwhile, guaranteed safety can generate a high premium for
domestic seafood versus products without a safety guarantee. But there is no such
certification for imported seafood. Second, eco-friendliness does not generate a price
premium in the current market, but consumers are willing to pay for it as long as they
are informed with public benefit information. Third, fully explained certification
information can significantly increase consumer WTP for sustainably farmed seafood,
most of which is due to their changes in perception regarding safety and ecofriendliness.
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The remainder of this paper is arranged as follows. Chapter 2 investigates
whether price premium exists, and the impact of information provided, of sustainably
farmed seafood using online retailers’ real market data. Chapter 3 uses an
experimental auction method to estimate consumer WTP for sustainably farmed
seafood under different information scenarios. Chapter 4 is an extension of Chapter 3.
It incorporates consumers’ subjective perceptions to estimate their WTP for the quality,
safety, and eco-friendliness of sustainably farmed seafood. Chapter 5 concludes.
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CHAPTER 2

ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF ONLINE RETAILERS’ INFORMATION ON THE
PRICE OF SUSTAINABLY FARMED SEAFOOD

Introduction
In an addition to wild capture fisheries, aquaculture makes a valuable contribution to
providing high-quality, affordable protein to the world, especially in developing
countries. It has, however, created intensive pressure on natural resources and the
environment. FAO statistics indicate that total global aquaculture production
(including both saltwater and freshwater) has exceeded capture fisheries since 2013,
and global marine aquaculture has increased rapidly over the past two decades (FAO
2011). Figure 2.1 shows the rapidly growing trend of global aquaculture production
from 1950 to 2015. FAO projects that aquaculture will be responsible for almost twothirds of the fish we eat by 2030.
While enjoying the benefits of this rapidly growing aquaculture industry, it is
critical to have a clear vision of its environmental impacts and correctly relay this
information to the general public. Cao et al. (2015) found that Chinese aquaculture
consumed 1.4 MT of fishmeal in 2012, equivalent to 6.7 MT of live-weight forage fish
(e.g., anchovy, sardine, herring, and menhaden). Extend this number to the global
aquaculture industry, and it is estimated that 20 MT of live-weight fish are processed
into fishmeal every year, accounting for more than 20% of total global wild capture
production. At the same time, it should be noted that traditional farming practices have
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heavily damaged the natural environment. Destructive farm construction often
decimates coastal wetlands, such as mangroves and saltmarshes. The effluent of
untreated wastewater that contains fishmeal residue could cause eutrophication in the
watershed. Overdosed antibiotics, drugs, and other chemical compounds could impair
the health of the entire ecosystem.
The concept of sustainable aquaculture was created about a decade ago following
a similar philosophy of sustainable wild fishery programs, such as MSC certification,
but it has additional standards on seafood quality and safety. Although the number of
sustainably certified aquaculture facilities and products is experiencing rapid growth,
the amount of sustainable production accounts only for a small portion of global
output. In 2010, only 4.2% of total aquaculture production was certified (Jonell et al.
2013). A more recent report from Global Good Agricultural Practice, a world leading
sustainable aquaculture certifier, indicates that they have certified 2.1 of MT seafood,
accounting for about 2% of global production. Jim Heerin, the president of BAP
Management, indicated that they certified less than one MT of production in 2015.
ASC, another sustainable aquaculture giant, supplied about 0.5 MT of seafood to the
market in 2015 (ASC 2017). An optimistic estimate is that 10% of farmed seafood has
been sustainably certified. Thus, the impacts of sustainable aquaculture on the natural
environment and resources remain limited. It is not because of deficiencies in
sustainable standards, but due to a constrained production quantity caused by a
complicated certification process and high costs (Belton et al. 2010; Ponte 2012; Bush
et al. 2013; Gutierrez et al. 2016). In other words, producers and retailers, especially
in developing countries, do not have enough economic incentive to become engaged in
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sustainable programs. More producers and retailers are needed to increase the impact
of sustainably farmed seafood. More importantly, consumer recognition and
confidence is needed for further development of the entire industry.
This chapter takes advantage of the well-developed Chinese online seafood
market, aiming to understand the impacts of seafood quality, safety, and ecofriendliness information on market price, particularly on whether price premium exists
for these attributes. Sustainably farmed seafood was introduced into the Chinese
market about five years ago, and the online retail market is one of the key distribution
channels. During the early stage of the movement, only a few imported products
carried aquaculture eco-labels. Most domestic certified seafood products were
exported to Western countries. But as demand gradually increased in mainland China,
more local products started to carry aquaculture eco-labels. Market observations
provide anecdotal evidence on the positive price premium for certified seafood, but it
has not yet been determined whether these certified aquaculture products can generate
a profit. Also, it is not certain whether there exists a premium for certification, country
of origin, or other attribute information. With multiple standards on seafood quality,
safety, and eco-friendliness, if aquaculture certification generates a significant price
premium, to what attribute(s) should the premium be ascribed? To date, very little
quantitative research has been conducted to answer these questions.
Another innovation of this research is to utilize sales price data and product
descriptions from online retailers’ websites. Online shopping is different from
traditional shopping, where consumers can spend more time comparing products and
evaluating the information provided by retailers. A highly competitive online retail
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market is a transparent trading platform where consumers can easily access
information of various products and retailers in a few minutes, forcing retailers to
update their prices frequently based on sales. A log-linear hedonic price model
suggests that there is a 6.6% premium for imported products when there is no farming
environment, safety, or eco-label information provided. When safety information is
provided, results indicate a higher safety premium for domestic certified shrimp over
imported. In sum, Chinese consumers place more trust in imported seafood when they
have enough information to assist in decision making, but they still prefer domestic
shrimp when there is a safety guarantee. To our surprise, eco-labels on websites have a
negative impact on price.
This chapter is arranged as follows. The next section presents a brief literature
review of related topics and indicates the contribution of this research. The third
section describes the data structure, followed by model specification and estimation.
Results and discussion are next, and the final section concludes and reports on policy
implications.

Background
It is vital to sustainable seafood programs and the seafood industry to show the true
effect of sustainability information on sustainable seafood price. Different methods are
adopted by scholars depending upon data availability. In the early 2000s when
sustainable seafood markets were becoming established, no market data was available,
so stated preference methods were used more frequently. Using the contingent choice
survey method, Wessells, Johnston, and Donath (1999) assessed the influence of
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certification on US consumer preferences for eco-labeled seafood. Johnston et al.
(2000) measured the difference between US and Norwegian consumer preferences for
organic, eco-labeled, and regular seafood using the choice survey method. Jaffry et al.
(2004) evaluated consumer choices for quality and sustainably labeled seafood
products in the UK through a choice experiment. Other researchers conducted similar
analysis on agricultural and wood products (Loureiro, McCluskey, and Mittelhammer
2001a; O’Brien and Teisl 2004). All these hypothetical choice experiments conclude
that consumers in Europe and the US are willing to pay a price premium for ecolabeled products, but no actual market premiums were estimated.
As more retailers committed to sustainable seafood, and consumers were exposed
to the concept, market data subsequently became available for analysis. Roheim,
Asche, and Santos (2011) found a 14.2% price premium was paid for MSC-labeled
products by UK consumers using retailer scanner data. In addition to a seafood ecolabel, Bronnmann and Asche (2016) found a price premium for brands and private
labels using German scanner household panel data and concluded that private-label
products were discounted by 20%. However, the branded products and certified
aquaculture products received substantial premiums.
Most previous research has focused on sustainable seafood products from the
capture fisheries, and little attention has been paid to certified aquaculture products.
Unlike wild fishery eco-labels, sustainable aquaculture certification does not only
require achievement of public benefits, like environmental impacts and fishery stocks,
but also has standards to ensure consumer private benefits like food quality and safety.
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Thus, the impact of aquaculture eco-labels is, by definition, very different from that of
wild fishery eco-labels.
This chapter uses online retailers’ price and product information to evaluate the
impact of information on Chinese consumer preferences. Detailed product descriptions
from the websites ensure the delivery of information to consumers, especially for ecolabel information. Previous studies take the eco-label as one integrated attribute, while
using online retail data can separate it into multiple basic attributes, like food quality,
safety, and eco-friendliness. This is a substantial improvement for sustainable seafood
attribute analysis, and the results can be more informative and useful.

Data description
White-leg shrimp (Penaeus vannamei) is used as the representative species for farmed
seafood because it is one of the most commonly produced and consumed seafood in
China and worldwide. White-leg shrimp is native to the eastern Pacific Ocean. It was
first cultured in Florida, USA, using mated females from Panama in 1973. White-leg
shrimp farming started in the Latin America in the 1990s, and began gaining
popularity in a few Asian countries around 2000 due to its high productivity and low
farming costs (approximately USD 2.5–3.0/kg for P. vannamei, compared to USD
3.0–4.0/kg for more extensive P. monodon culture) (FAO 2016). Currently, Ecuador
and China are two of its biggest producers (Huntington and Hasan 2009; FAO 2011).
Two types of data were used in this research: (1). weekly online price data from
different retailers collected through a price tracking website (manmanbuy.com) from
June 17, 2016 to April 30, 2017, and (2) product attribute information collected
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through retailers’ webpages. Sampled products are all frozen raw white-leg shrimp
produced in either China or Ecuador. Some were certified as sustainable by a third
party and some not. Table 2.1 displays the variables and a summary of the descriptive
statistics.
In Table 2.1, product attribute information is divided into three blocks that fully
capture product characteristics (Darby and Karni 1973; Ford, Smith, and Swasy 1988).
The first block is search attributes. Consumers could evaluate these attributes through
pre-purchase searching activities. Nearly all retailers provide this type of information
on their product webpage, and it is easily verified. The second block is additional
information provided by retailers to differentiate their products from others. These
experience attributes are difficult are difficult to verify before purchasing, since only
when the product is received or consumed, can the consumer discern the truthfulness
of the information. The last block contains the credence attributes, which are the major
focus of this research. These attributes build on consumer trust of the retailers and
certifiers, and such information could possibly induce a price premium.
The search attributes were examined first. The most important variable, the
dependent variable, is price. Originally, daily prices were collected from
“manmanbuy.com,” but the data were averaged into weekly prices because retailers
usually adjust their prices once a week. There is no benefit to having repeated samples
in the dataset. The average weekly price for all products is about 57 yuan/500 g (US
$8/pound). Whole shrimp comprises 66.8% of the samples; the rest are peeled. Shrimp
size varies from small to jumbo. The criteria used are from the size chart in
international trade. For whole shrimp, small is about 41–60 count/pound, medium 31–
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40, large 21–30, and jumbo 16–20. For peeled shrimp, small is about 51–70
count/pound, medium 41–50, large 31–40, and jumbo 21–25. In this dataset, the
average size is between medium and large, but closer to medium. Package size is
another important factor that impacts retail price. Large-sized packages tend to have a
lower price. Frozen shrimp sold online has an average weight of 1,179 grams (2.6
pounds). Product ratings can be found on the product webpage, which is automatically
generated by the system and cannot be altered by retailers. It serves as a
comprehensive evaluation for both the product and retailer services. The most recent
scores were used to represent product ratings for two reasons. First, it is extremely
difficult to acquire daily ratings of each product from retailers or Alibaba.com (the
online retail platform). Second, since most products have been launched for a long
time and received tens of thousands of reviews, product ratings would not change
significantly during our research period. This is a control variable for retailers’
unobserved heterogeneity.
The experience attributes are the retailers’ statements regarding freshness,
product weight, and ice glazing rate. Basically, they are describing products quality,
which can be verified by consumers upon arrival. These attributes are dummy
variables that take the value 1 if retailers claim such an attribute on the website and 0
otherwise. Usually different retailers use similar descriptions and images to illustrate
these characteristics. For example, they use phrases such as “Fresh out of the water,
frozen immediately to –30ºF, fast shipping and guaranteed fresh at your door, and full
refund if not satisfied” to describe the freshness of their products. Ice rate is a very
specific attribute that many consumers may not notice. Normally, frozen seafood is
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glazed with a layer of saltwater and chemicals to maintain moisture during shipping.
But this reduces the actual product weight. About 10% of the products guarantee that
the shrimp will meet the displayed package weight after defrosting. However, less
than 3% of the products indicate the actual ice rate contained in the package.
Five credence attributes are included in the analysis, all of which are dummy
variables. The first one is “imported.” Imported products have a special appeal to
Chinese consumers regardless of origin because stringent import custom’s inspection
is viewed as insurance for product quality and safety. Frequent domestic food safety
incidents destroy consumer confidence in domestic products. Thus an “imported” label
is expected to have some impact on the price, and 60% of our samples are from
Ecuador.
Safety is another key factor that impacts the price. As mentioned above, food
safety is extremely important in China. Government and retailers have invested a great
amount of resources to improve food safety during production and retailing. Typical
safety information displayed by online retailers is a copy of safety inspection
certificate, such as Hazard Analysis Critical Control Point (HACCP). According to the
FDA (2017) definition, “HACCP is a systematic preventive approach to food safety
from biological, chemical, and physical hazards in production processes that can cause
the finished product to be unsafe, and designs measurements to reduce these risks to a
safe level.” Additional presentation of safety information includes descriptive
statements guaranteeing no antibiotic use. About 40% of the products in the dataset
contain safety information. Farm environment is mentioned by 32% of products,
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which emphasize the water quality at the farm. It is a vague concept that can be
viewed as a representation of both quality and safety.
The variable “eco-label” indicates whether or not the product webpage explicitly
displays a sustainable seafood certification label like, “BAP.” Only 9% of products
display an eco-label. However, about 38% of the products in the dataset are actually
sustainably certified. The reason why retailers hesitate to display an eco-label on a
Chinese website may be the lack of Chinese consumers’ confidence in and knowledge
of the label, as well as additional costs of using them. Most domestic producers get
certified because they need such designation for international market access.
Regarding the domestic market, this certification was not as important as in the
Western market.
An additional variable “certified” was added to capture the product’s quality
improvement through the certification program. It is not an attribute for ecofriendliness, since consumers are not informed of the certification. The only way for
the “certified” attribute to impact consumers is through the repurchase behavior
caused by the product consumption experience. In other words, products that are
certified but do not contain an eco-label are assumed to be of higher quality, attracting
consumers to purchase again and pay higher prices.

Model specification and estimation
Following previous research by Roheim, Asche, and Santos (2011) and Bronnmann
and Asche (2016), a log-linear hedonic price model was adopted for the analysis. This
price model was developed by Lancaster (1966) and Rosen (1974) to evaluate
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consumer demand for product attributes. It is widely used in the assessment of nonmarket value of environmental and natural resources (Ready and Abdalla 2005;
Sander and Polasky 2009; Gopalakrishnan et al. 2011), as well as product attributes
(Sogn-Grundvåg, Larsen, and Young 2014; Wang 2016). The value of a pricedetermining attribute can be evaluated by the presence or absence of the attribute
within the product (Wessells 2002). Thus, a general model can be written as
following:
𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡 = 𝑓(𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑡𝑒1 , … 𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑡𝑒𝑛 ),
where 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡 is product i’s price at time period t, and is determined by a function
of n attributes.
The functional model is shown as:
𝑙𝑛(𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡 ) = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑎𝑔𝑒_𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽2 𝑤ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽3 𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑎𝑔𝑒_𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖 ∗ 𝑤ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑒𝑖
+ 𝛽4 𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑠ℎ𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖 + 𝛽5 𝑓𝑢𝑙𝑙_𝑤𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑖 + 𝛽6 𝑖𝑐𝑒_𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽7 𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖
+ 𝛽8 𝑠𝑎𝑓𝑒𝑡𝑦𝑖 + 𝛽9 𝑓𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑖 + 𝛽10 𝑒𝑐𝑜_𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑒𝑙𝑖 + 𝛽11 𝑐𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑒𝑑𝑖
+ 𝛽12 𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖 ∗ 𝑠𝑎𝑓𝑒𝑡𝑦𝑖 + 𝛽13 𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖 ∗ 𝑐𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑒𝑑𝑖
3

4

6

+ ∑ 𝛿𝑠 𝑠ℎ𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑝_𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑠 + ∑ 𝜃𝑟 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑟 + ∑ 𝜑𝑐 𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑐 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡
𝑠=1

𝑟=1

𝑐=1

where ln(priceit) is the price of product i at time period t in logarithmic form;
package sizei is the only continuous variable, and is the package size of product i in
100 grams. All other variables are dummies. Safetyi, farmi, and eco-labeli are dummy
variables indicating whether or not the website provides product safety information,
farm environmental condition information, and an eco-label respectively. Certifiedi is
a variable that indicates whether or not product i has achieved certification even if this
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information is not shown on the website. Variables such as import, whole, freshness,
full_weight, ice_rate, Shrimp_size, rating and city are also controlled as dummies.
Three interaction terms are added to test the cross effects of those variables. Some
other factors, like product brand and retail brand, are not included in the model since
they are highly collinear with some independent variables. 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is an individual specific
error term that contains all other factors that are not included in the model.
𝛼 is the constant term, and 𝛽, 𝛿, 𝜃, and 𝜑 are variable coefficients to be estimated.
Because this is a log-linear model, each estimated coefficient can be interpreted
as the percentage marginal value of the attribute. For example, 𝛽1means that a 100
𝛽

1
gram increase in package weight will increase 100
% in total price, ceteris paribus (this

condition also applies to the following statements); 𝛽8 can be interpreted as the
𝛽

8
presence of safety information on the website can increase/decrease 100
% in price, or

𝛽

8
consumers are more/less willing to pay 100
% price for the safety information on the

website. Interaction terms represent the effect of one variable on the other. For
example, 𝛽3 can be interpreted as the price change rate difference between whole
shrimp and peeled shrimp when package size increases by 100 grams. s, r, and c are
indices of the variables. There are four shrimp sizes, thus three dummies. Product
ratings could be considered continuous variables, but there are only five different
values so we created four dummies. Retailer locations are represented by six dummies.
Two estimation models are displayed in Table 2.2; one without interaction terms
and one with them. The models were estimated using STATA software version 12.
Several tests were conducted to ensure the efficiency and consistency of the results.
First, homoscedasticity was rejected by the Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg test for
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both models. A clustered variance robust estimation was then used to correct for
heteroscedasticity. Collinearity between independent variables was tested by checking
the variance inflation factors (VIF). VIFs in Model 1 are under 10 with for variables,
while interaction terms in Model 2 show larger VIFs. For adjusted R-square, Model 2
has a higher value. Finally, after checking the magnitudes and signs of the coefficient
estimates, Model 2 contains more insightful information and a better explanation due
to the inclusion of interaction terms. Thus, it is used to interpret regression results in
the following section.

Results and discussion
The results will be explained block by block. An F-test of the model rejected the null
hypothesis that all estimated coefficients are jointly equal to zero.

Search attributes:
Products with large packages usually have lower unit prices. Here, since both whole
and peeled shrimp are considered, the effects of package size on price are different.
Together with the interaction term pack*whole, when it comes to peeled shrimp
(whole=0), there is no significant price impact due to package size. For whole shrimp
(whole=1), when package size increases by 100 grams, price decreases by 2.8%, all
else equal. This is reasonable because peeled shrimp are usually sold in small
packages, 200g or 500g, while whole shrimp packages can contain from 200g to
2000g.
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Experience attributes
No experience attributes were expected to have positive impacts on product prices
because they could be verified immediately after receiving the package. A retailers’
guarantee does not apply to returning customers, rather the first-time purchasers. New
consumers do not comprise the major customer group of a well-established online
market. Results indicate that a full-weight guarantee has a small positive premium of
3.7%. Neither a freshness guarantee nor ice glazing rate information has a significant
impact on prices. For most repeat buyers, this type of information is irrelevant.

Credence attributes:
As mentioned earlier, credence attributes are difficult to test or verify through normal
consumption. Thus, the information provided by the retailers is very important for
consumer’s decision-making. For the imported attribute, both safety and certified
information can be interpreted together. Table 2.2 shows that without safety
information (safety=0) or certification (cert=0), imported products have a 6.6% price
premium over domestic products. When safety information is provided (safety=1), but
the products are not certified (cert=0), domestic products are 37% more expensive
than imported products. When there is no safety information (safety=0) but the
products are certified (cert=1), consumers are willing to pay a 14.7% price premium
for imported products. Finally, when there is safety information (safety=1) and the
products are certified (cert=1), there is a 29% price premium for imported products. In
conclusion, providing safety information is critical for domestic products. When there
is no safety information, consumers generally prefer imported products.
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For domestic products, safety information generates a 36% premium, while it
does not generate a positive price premium on imported products. On the whole, there
is a 44% premium difference between domestic and imported seafood in terms of
safety information. Certification has no significant impact on domestic products, but
generates an 8% price premium on imported shrimp. This means that imported,
certified shrimp are of higher quality and consumers have realized this through
repeated consumption. For certified domestic shrimp, consumers did not perceive a
significant difference in quality from uncertified shrimp; thus, there is no premium
found.
Results also indicate a 8.4% premium when retailers provide positive information
about the farm environment, but no positive effect is observed for an eco-label. The
descriptive words that retailers use for farm environment are always vague, and
appealing pictures seem very attractive to consumers, leading to the assumption that
the farm environment is related to shrimp quality and safety. Since safety information
has already been included, the farm environment might be more relevant to quality.
Only 9% of products display an eco-label and it a negative effect on shrimp price. It is
probably because Chinese consumers are still very unfamiliar with the concept and
have some doubt about the credibility of the producers and certifiers. This lack of trust
is very critical to the expansion and development of sustainable seafood in China.

Other attributes:
Other attributes, such as shrimp size, product rating, and retailer location are also
included in the regression. Since they are not our main focus, we will only summarize
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them here. Ratings do not seem to impact prices significantly. Only products with a
100% score have an 8% price premium. Shrimp sizes impact price significantly.
Medium, large, and extra-large shrimp have a price premium of 4, 9, and 25%,
respectively, over small-sized shrimp. In terms of location, with Beijing as the base,
Dalian, Guangzhou, and Ningbo are not significantly different from Beijing.
Hangzhou and Shanghai are 5% cheaper, which may be due to their better geographic
location and more advanced logistics industry.

Conclusion
Promotion of sustainable seafood has never been an easy job anywhere in the world. It
requires a long-term commitment from all players within the supply chain, as well as
awareness and acceptance from consumers. Initiating a new product campaign without
support from consumers is almost an impossible mission. Recent research shows that
North American consumers do not have enough incentives to pay a premium for
sustainable seafood. Corporate efforts are mostly a social responsibility created by
mainstream retailers to improve their image and reputation. So far, very limited
positive environmental impact has been generated through programs or campaigns.
Thus, it is not suggested to promote sustainable seafood applying marketing strategies
in Western world to China, especially when Chinese consumers have lower incomes
and are more sensitive to food prices. Fostering consumer awareness and generating
consumer demand are the keys to the success in the Chinese market.
This study suggests that seafood safety is the biggest concern of Chinese
consumers. For domestic shrimp, safety information generates a 36% price premium,
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while safety information does not affect the price for imported products. When there is
no safety information, there is a 14.6 and 6.6% price premium for imported certified
products and non-certified products over domestic products, respectively.Good
farming environment also generates a 8% premium. These results tell retailers to focus
more on seafood quality and safety, regardless of source. It is also a good strategy to
combine sustainability with quality and safety information for certified farmed
seafood instead of simply pushing the relatively new concept of sustainability to
Chinese consumers. At the policy level, the Chinese government has already noticed
the difference between export-oriented and domestic-oriented production and
launched new policies last year to ensure they were from the same production line
with consistent labelling and standards. This may bolster Chinese consumer
confidence in domestic products, but only the passing of time will demonstrate their
effectiveness and impacts on Chinese consumer behavior.
Some concerns of this research fall on consumer perception of online retailers’
information. Because every piece of information is provided by retailers, consumers’
opinions could not be assessed. Their level of understanding of this information is
uncertain. The eco-label information is a very typical example. One cannot deny the
contribution of eco-labels, simply because there are no significant effects from the
regression. Most Chinese consumers are not familiar with the standards and values
associated with these labels, as they are basically some unrecognized symbols. If more
explanatory information is provided, consumers may elicit different responses. The
following chapters use stated preference methods, like experimental auctions, which
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will capture both consumer WTP and perceptions on the information they receive.
More precise conclusions can be formulated through this type of research.

23

(MT)

Figure 2.1. Comparison of Global Aquaculture and
Wild Seafood Production
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Data source: FAO Fishery Statistics 2017.
Notes: Total Aqua indicates total global aquaculture production; Total Wild indicates
total global wild fisheries production; Marine Aqua indicates global marine aquaculture
production; Marine Wild indicates global marine wild fisheries production.
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Table 2.1. Product Attributes and Description
Attribute

Mean

Std.
Dev.

Description

Search attribute
Price
Shrimp size

57.732
2.352

17.039
0.871

Package size
Whole
Product rating

1179.086
0.668
97.304

771.498
0.471
1.628

Yuan/500g, weekly average price
Small=1, Medium=2, Large=3, Jumbo=4
treated as dummies in regression
Grams
Whole=1, peeled=0
Consumer rating of product; scale = 100
points

Experience attribute
Freshness
0.790
guaranty

0.408

Dummy variable, yes=1, retailer’s claim of
product freshness

Weight
guaranty

0.104

0.306

Dummy variable, yes=1, retailer’s claim of
product weight

Ice rate

0.026

0.159

Dummy variable, yes=1, webpage
description of ice glazing rate

Credence attribute
Imported
0.592

0.492

Dummy variable, yes=1, imported from
Ecuador
Dummy variable, yes=1, webpage
description of product safety

Safety
information

0.390

0.488

Farm
environment

0.322

0.468

Dummy variable, yes=1, webpage
description of farming environment

Eco-label

0.090

0.286

Dummy variable, yes=1, webpage
description of product eco-label

Certified

0.377

0.485

Dummy variable, yes=1, Sustainability
certified by third party
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Variable
Constant

Table 2.2. Model Coefficient Estimation Results
(1)
Price (in logs)
4.416***
(0.023)

Search attributes
Package size (100g)
Whole shrimp (yes=1)

–0.021***
(0.001)
–0.199***
(0.017)

0.001
(0.004)
–0.076***
(0.022)
–0.028***
(0.004)

–0.051***
(0.013)
0.103***
(0.016)
0.579***
(0.066)

–0.014
(0.015)
0.037**
(0.015)
0.045
(0.034)

–0.036
(0.029)
–0.099***
(0.019)
0.107***
(0.017)
0.268***
(0.039)
0.062***
(0.016)

0.066**
(0.027)
0.364***
(0.065)
0.084***
(0.015)
–0.076**
(0.039)
0.009
(0.034)
–0.436***
(0.068)
0.081***
(0.028)
1,542
0.745
0

Package size × whole shrimp
Experience attributes
Guaranteed fresh (yes=1)
Guaranteed full weight (yes=1)
Ice glazing rate information (yes=1)
Credence attributes
Imported from Ecuador (yes=1)
Safety information (yes=1)
Farm environment information (yes=1)
Eco-label on website (yes=1)
Sustainable certification (yes=1)
Imported × safety
Imported × certified

(2)
Price (in logs)
4.315***
(0.025)

Observations
1,542
Adjusted R-squared
0.738
Pr>F
0
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05.
All variable information is collected from product websites, except for the sustainable
certification variable. This is verified by the author through the producer websites,
which most consumers will not access. Other control variables not reported in this
table include shrimp size, product rating, and retailer location.
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CHAPTER 3

THE EFFECTS OF SUSTAINABILITY CERTIFICATION INFORMATION ON
CHINESE CONSUMER WILLINGNESS TO PAY FOR FARMED SEAFOOD

Introduction
Sustainably farmed seafood was introduced to China several years ago, but Chinese
retailers and producers are still facing great challenges marketing it to the general
public (Fabinyi 2016). Since late 1990s, sustainable seafood programs, like
certification and eco-labeling, have been successfully developed and promoted in
Europe and North America as a market-based tool to complement the traditional
“command and control” fishery management scheme (Wessells, Johnston, and Donath
1999; Johnston et al. 2001; Ponte 2012). However, the concept of sustainable seafood,
especially farmed seafood, has not been well accepted in China despite almost
constant effort dedicated to public education and supply chain engagement (Fabinyi
2012; Fabinyi and Liu 2016). The challenges can be summarized in two categories:
consumer awareness and consumer acceptance, both of which are the key to the
success of sustainable seafood programs (Wessells 2002). In major Chinese cities,
such as Beijing and Shanghai, consumers have some awareness of green-labeled/ecolabeled1 seafood, but they are willing to pay a premium only if additional food quality
or safety information is provided (Xu et al. 2012; Fabinyi 2016). Chinese consumers
are more concerned with the private benefits of certified seafood than those associated

1

A green-label is a Chinese domestic food certification similar to organic certification, but with lower
standards.
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with environment improvements. On the retail side, they are not familiar with, or do
not pay much attention to, the multiple dimensions of aquaculture eco-label standards.
Thus, they cannot effectively deliver this information to consumers. To the best of our
knowledge, no research has been conducted regarding the impact of consumer
purchasing behavior on the private and public benefit information of farmed seafood
certification. Providing scientific evidence and solutions to these challenges can
facilitate both retailers and producers in reaching more sustainable goals for their
businesses. They can also provide insights to the Chinese government on ongoing
fisheries reform (Cao et al. 2015, 2017).
Another concern is whether or not consumers really care about the ecofriendliness of sustainable seafood (Wessells 2002; Gulbrandsen 2006; Uchida et al.
2014b). There is a consensus that eco-labeled seafood generates a 10–20% price
premium over non-labeled, but it is hard to draw a solid conclusion that consumers are
willing to pay for eco-friendliness. In previous studies, consumers are not given full
information about the standards of certification or eco-labels, and market data, like
retailer scanner data, captures neither consumer’s demographic information nor their
perceptions about the implications of eco-labels attached to the seafood. It is
inappropriate to apply the conclusions of wild seafood studies to farmed seafood
because they have different certification standards. Unlike sustainable wild seafood
with pure public benefits, such as environmental and community concerns, sustainably
farmed seafood standards also consider consumers’ private benefits like seafood
quality and safety (Roheim, Sudhakaran, and Durham 2012).
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Again, this study applies the experimental auction method and uses sustainably
farmed seafood as an example to investigate Chinese consumer WTP for private and
public benefit information provided by certification. Inspired by Maslow’s Hierarchy
of Needs, a similar figure for seafood consumption was created. Figure 3.1 shows that
consumers want high-quality seafood and seafood safety, as well as environmental and
social contributions. The demand for these attributes is pyramid shaped—physical
needs form the base, and psychological needs are located on top. It is of great value to
understand how consumers allocate their resources to different attributes of seafood
and what factors impact their decisions. Sustainably farmed seafood is a good subject
for this study because it covers most of the attributes outlined in the figure.
This study indicates that: 1. Public benefit information has a significantly high
impact on consumers’ WTP for certified products, whether domestic or imported, and
it is necessary to provide public benefit information prior to private benefit
information. 2. There exists preference for certification of imported products over
domestic products, which reveals Chinese consumers’ lack of trust regarding the
credibility of certifiers, as well as their opinions concerning the inability of domestic
producers to be compliant. 3. Domestically certified products have a higher response
to the information than imported certified products, which is a positive signal for
domestic marketers and producers.
The remainder of the chapter proceeds as follows. First, we briefly discuss the
background of our study, explain the experimental design, and describe the data
collected from experiment. This is followed by the regression models and results. The
final section concludes the chapter.
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Background
Consumer preferences for wild sustainable seafood have been extensively studied for
approximately two decades, while little research has been conducted on the farmed
seafood sector (Roheim, Sudhakaran, and Durham 2012), particularly in developing
countries. Researchers began to study the Chinese sustainable seafood market only a
few years ago (Xu et al. 2012). Chinese consumer preferences for seafood are very
different from those in Western countries due to unique social norms and the culinary
culture, but their tastes are also changing with the times (Fabinyi and Liu 2016). In
recent years, Chinese consumer demand for imported seafood has increased rapidly
because of frequent outbreaks of domestic food safety incidents (Han and Bi 2016),
coupled with fast-growing household income (The World Bank 2016). Chapter 2
states that without safety information or certification, Chinese consumers are willing
to pay a premium for imported seafood products; however, for certified domestic
products with safety information, consumers tend to pay more. It is certain that
Chinese consumers care about seafood safety more than other attributes, but due to the
limit of eco-friendly information presented on websites, we could not tell whether or
not they are willing to pay a price premium for that public benefit. This is an important
area of research for the development of Chinese sustainable aquaculture, because only
an accurate description of consumer preferences can help formulate effective
marketing strategies.
Seafood producers, especially sustainable seafood producers in China, rely
heavily on exports and have very limited price bargaining power in international
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markets. This can potentially cause a downturn for the expansion of sustainable
seafood programs in China. The blue swimming crab Fishery Improvement Projects
(FIPs) in Indonesia is an example.2 Totally relying on Western markets for fishery
sustainability improvement is too risky for developing country fisheries. Generating
domestic demand for sustainable seafood is an urgent task.
Literature on consumer preferences for sustainable seafood started around 2000,
when the first lot of sustainable seafood arrived in the European market. Wessells,
Johnston, and Donath (1999) pointed out the importance of consumer knowledge and
demand for market-based solutions to fishery sustainability. This paper outlines the
impact of safety and quality information on consumer decision-making. This was the
first seminal paper in the field and inspired a wide range of research. In early 2000,
scholars focused on consumer preferences for eco-labeled wild seafood in North
America and Europe. Contingent choice surveys were often used to test factors that
influence consumer likelihood of its purchase (Wessells, Johnston, and Donath 1999;
Johnston et al. 2001; Jaffry et al. 2004). Researchers unanimously conclude that
consumers are willing to pay a price premium for eco-labeled products, but they did
not evaluate the quantitative levels of the premium. After 2006 as more and more
North American and European retailers started to commit to sustainable seafood,
quantitative research was made possible by enriched market data. Roheim, Asche, and
Santos (2011) applied scanner data from several London retailers to a hedonic model
and found consumers were willing to pay a 14.2% price premium for MSC-certified

2

Blue swimming crab FIPs in Indonesia were very successful at the beginning. However, they rely
heavily on the Western market for sustainability development. When there were not enough economic
incentives provided by Western buyers, they chose to degrade their fishing practices and switched to the
local market.
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seafood in the UK. Bronnmann and Asche (2016) used German market scanner data
and found a much lower price premium (4%) for MSC-certified seafood and a higher
premium for farmed seafood (28%). Besides the Western market, a few studies were
also conducted in Japan and China. Onozaka et al. (2010) studied Japanese consumer
preferences and acknowledge the positive attitudes of Japanese consumers toward
sustainable seafood. Uchida et al. (2014b) confirm this with an auction experiment,
finding a statistically significant premium of about 20% for MSC-labeled salmon over
non-labeled when consumers are provided with information on both the status of
global fish stocks and the purpose of the MSC program. Xu et al. (2012) found that
Chinese consumers are willing to pay a price premium for eco-labeled seafood, and
price is not a significant factor affect purchasing decisions. These results show
promise for use in creating a sustainable seafood market in China. However, some
studies show that very little of the price premium generated by eco-labeling will flow
to producers (Stemle, Uchida, and Roheim 2015; Blomquist, Bartolino, and Waldo
2015). Thus, there exists a great challenge to the further development of sustainable
fishery programs, especially in developing countries. A local or domestic market could
potentially solve this problem, since most eco-labeled seafood is now internationally
traded, and the premiums have to be shared by multiple supply chain players.
Producers are more likely to be rewarded for their sustainable practices by the support
of local/domestic consumers. The first step of creating a domestic market is to have a
comprehensive analysis of targeted consumers.
Three research methods are commonly adopted by scholars. The most popular
method is contingent choice experiment estimated by a multinomial probit/logit model
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(Wessells, Johnston, and Donath 1999; Johnston et al. 2001; Loureiro, McCluskey,
and Mittelhammer 2001; Jaffry et al. 2004; Roheim, Sudhakaran, and Durham 2012;
Brécard et al. 2012; Uchida et al. 2014a). The choice experiment is a classic way to
elicit consumer preference over a few options when revealed preference data is not
available. Using a probit or logit model, it is easy to estimate consumer WTP for a few
product attribute of interest. However, high cost and complicated design have limited
the wide application of this method in developing countries. Revealed preference data
is favored more with the popularization of sustainable seafood products from the
retailing ends. Researchers can access retailers’ scanner data or online retail data
through data service providers or simply online fetching. A hedonic model is useful
for the estimation of consumer WTP for various product attributes (Roheim, Asche,
and Santos 2011; Asche et al. 2015; Bronnmann and Asche 2016; Wang 2016). The
disadvantage of this method is that it cannot incorporate consumer characteristics and
test their impact on consumer behavior. According to Lusk’s research, consumer
perception can significantly affect the interpretation of estimation results (Lusk,
Schroeder, and Tonsor 2014). The last method discussed here is experimental auction.
Consumer WTP for certain product attributes can be directly elicited from auction
results. Information treatments can also be designed into the experiment to test their
effectiveness. Further, pre- and post-experiment surveys can be conducted to collect
personal information to complement the main experiment as needed (Uchida et al.
2014b; Lusk, Schroeder, and Tonsor 2014). Some other research methods are also
found in literature, such as using data from landings tickets and log books (Blomquist,
Bartolino, and Waldo 2015), and interview-based analysis (Fabinyi and Liu 2016).
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The method adopted in this study is the experimental auction, with the objective
to estimate the treatment effects of private and public benefit information of an
aquaculture eco-label on consumers’ WTP for sustainably farmed seafood.

Experiment design and data description
Similar to Chapter 2, white-leg shrimp (Penaeus vannamei) is used again as the
representative species. All auctioned products in the experiment were whole, frozen
shrimp of the same size to simplify the experiment procedure and data analysis.
A sealed-bid, second-price auction was used, which means the highest price
bidder wins the game, but pays the second-highest price. Over the past few decades,
several auction methods have been designed to test consumers’ WTP, such as the
English, Nth price, Becker-Degroot-Marschak (BDM), and random Nth price auctions.
All these methods can be designed into incentive-compatible games, and all have
advantages and disadvantages(Lusk 2003) . Based on our research objective, an easyto-understand method that can also receive controlled feedback from participants is
desired. A second-price auction is a good option for this study, although there is
evidence of subject overbidding (Kagel, Harstad, and Levin 1987; Lusk, Feldkamp,
and Schroeder 2004). It is not a serious issue because the bidding difference within
subjects is of the major research interest.
A series of experimental auctions was conducted in the spring of 2017 in Xiamen,
China, a southeast coastal city with a population of nearly 4 million people. Xiamen is
a well-known city in China with a long history of inshore and offshore fisheries.
Seafood has always played a vital role in its culinary culture. Due to the collapse of
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wild fish stocks and the rapid increase of market demand, aquaculture has become its
main source of seafood in recent years. Thus, it is considered a good place to focus our
consumer preference analysis for sustainably farmed seafood in China. Below is a
brief introduction of the participant structure and experiment design.
Participants were recruited through social media of a few local organizations and
groups. A screening survey was then used to ensure that research subjects were at least
18 years old and regular seafood purchasers. After screening, 78 qualified residents
participated in 8 experiment sessions, and 76 effective pre-auction surveys were
received. Table 3.1 shows the participant demographics. About 70% are female,
compared to a 51% female ratio in Xiamen city (Xiamen Statistics Bureau 2017). This
is acceptable because food purchasing and cooking is mostly done by females in
China. Due to screening, bias is expected on the gender distribution. Our age data
ranges from 20s to 70s for the participants. We were not able to collect income data,
because it is a very sensitive, private question to ask in China, but we gathered
occupation data, which can partly represent income. Occupation data show that most
of our participants are office workers, in sales, or teachers. This means they are near or
at the average income class. Only 17% are students, and 27% are housewives or
househusbands. In terms of purchasing frequency, 65% of participants purchase
seafood 1–3 times a month. Twenty-two percent purchase once a week, and the rest
usually purchase twice a week. Fifty percent of participants purchase seafood at a wet
market, which is a Chinese tradition, but these outlets usually lack seafood
information. The supermarket share is increasing annually, and it is expected to be the
main channel in the future. A few participants buy online or directly from fishmen.
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Survey results also show that consumer understanding of seafood sustainability
remains at an extremely low level; 42% have never heard about it and another 40%
have heard, but did not understand the concept. Only one participant had solid
knowledge of sustainable seafood. It is a critical issue, but it also means most
participants were at the same knowledge level, which provides a good opportunity to
study the impact of information treatments on consumer behavior. Generally, this
sample provides a good representation of the population of Xiamen City, as well as
southern coastal cities similar to Xiamen.
There are 8 sessions in this experiment and 9–12 participants in each session. All
sessions consist of 12 rounds that are evenly divided into 3 blocks by information
treatment. Four types of shrimp are used in this experiment: domestic/non-labeled
shrimp (DN); domestic/eco-labeled shrimp (DE); imported/non-labeled shrimp (IN);
and imported/eco-labeled shrimp (IE). Participants were asked to place their bids
under different information scenarios. The auction orders of different product types
were altered in each session to balance ordering effects, but the labeled and nonlabeled products were always adjacent to each other for better treatment effects. See
Table 3.2 for the design.
In block 1 (rounds 1 to 4), participants were shown pictures of four shrimp
products, one at a time (Figure 3.2). 3 They were then given basic information
regarding country of origin and eco-labeling of the products and were asked to submit
their bids for each product. For example, in round 1 they were shown a picture of
shrimp and told that they were farmed in mainland China and did not have an eco-

3

All pictures are from producers’ website. Product sizes were also controlled to minimize bias.
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label. Then they were asked, “How much are you willing to pay for 500 grams of this
product?”
In block 2 (rounds 5 to 8), participants were given additional information about
eco-labeling. In sessions 1–4, private benefit information was given, and in sessions
5–8 public benefit information was provided. Then, participants repeated their
activities as in block 1.
In block 3 (rounds 9 to 12), we gave participants an additional piece of
information that was not provided in block 2. Then, they repeated thee activities as in
blocks 1 and 2. Detailed treatment information can be found in Table 3.3. The
standards were adopted from “Best Aquaculture Practice Certification Standards,
Guidelines” (BAP 2017). So as not to bias participants’ valuation, we did not mention
which certifying body provided the information.
Each session started by reading the introduction, objectives, and rationale of the
research, followed by the optimal bidding strategy. Following Uchida et al.(2014b),
the bidding strategy was explained and demonstrated. This could potentially lead to
slightly higher average bids than those using other methods (Lusk et al. 2004), but this
bias should appear equally across treatments. A practice round was played for candy
bars to familiarize participants with the auction mechanism. For incentive
compatibility, after 12 rounds of bidding we used a lottery system to decide one
winner for real purchase. All participants received 150 yuan (about US $25) of
compensation, except for the winners. The winners had to purchase the product of the
winning round at the second highest price using part of their compensation and
received the rest of the money. Since it is impractical and unhygienic to award actual
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shrimp products, prizes were delivered from online retailers to the winners’ homes
directly.

Data description
Panel data using 78 individuals and 12 time-period rounds resulted in 936 sample
points. The dependent variable is the bid placed by individuals in each round, and
dependent variables are product forms and information treatments. See Table 3.4 for
the summary statistics of the main variables. The average bidding for all products is
around 35 yuan (about US $6), which is close to the true market value for 500 grams
of shrimp in China. Product types and information treatments are all dummy variables.
All four product types are evenly tested throughout the experiment. For information
treatments, basic information was given in sessions 1‒8; private and private + public
benefit information was given in sessions 1‒4; public and public + private benefit
information was given in sessions 5‒8. The sample sizes are nearly identical for the
two parts.
Tables 3.5–3.8 display the treatment effects. First, all bidding is separated into
two groups of country of origin and eco-labeling to evaluate consumers’ average WTP
for each category and test whether or not there is a price premium for imported
products and eco-labeled products. As shown in Table 3.5, columns 1, 2, 5, and 6 list
the means and standard deviations of each category. Columns 3 and 7 show the
differences of imported versus domestic products and eco-labeled versus non-labeled
products. Columns 4 and 8 display the t-values of the differences tested using a paired
t-test at the 95% confidence interval. All bidding is also categorized by information
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treatments from basic to full information. This table is not difficult to interpret. In row
1, when given only basic information, consumers are willing to pay 29.83 and 36.36
yuan, on average, for domestic and imported shrimp, respectively. There exists a
significant premium of 6.54 yuan for imported over domestic shrimp. This signifies
that the difference is not caused by a few extremely high bids, but an average high bid
for imported shrimp across all participants. Reading this table as a whole, we find
more interesting results. Comparing column 3 to column 7, with only basic
information consumers are willing to pay more than 20% for imported and eco-labeled
products. Providing private benefit information of sustainable certification increases
consumer WTP for both domestic and imported products, but does not generate a
premium for imported products. Further, providing public benefit information
generates a premium for imported products. This means Chinese consumers view
domestic and foreign producers as identical for providing private benefits, while they
are willing to pay more for foreign producers to provide public benefit services. In
other words, they do not trust domestic producers who provide public services. For
eco-labels, consumers also act positively when public benefit information is provided,
which means they still view sustainable aquaculture eco-labels as a public-service
provider only, even when they were informed of private benefit information. It is not
feasible to conduct a vertical comparison, since no tests have been conducted across
information treatments and the sample sizes are not equal.
Table 3.6 compares the bidding from information treatment groups against the
basic information group (the control group is omitted in the table). Again, we group all
bidding into four basic categories. Except for the non-labeled category, the remaining
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categories show positive, significant premiums in the “public then private benefit
information” treatment. This is because all three categories have an eco-labeled
attribute involved, which is very effective in generating consumer WTP upon public
benefit information provision according to the results from Table 3.5. For the nonlabeled category, private benefit information does a better job than public benefit
information. Since non-labeled products do not provide any private benefits from
certification, this premium could only come from the imported section of the nonlabeled products, and consumers might believe that imported products could also
provide some private benefits even without certification, but not public benefits. No
significant sequential effect was shown in the domestic category. While in the
imported and eco-labeled categories, “public then private benefit” information has a
greater impact than “private then public benefit” information.
Since the categories in Tables 3.5 and 3.6 are not mutually exclusive, we can only
have a basic understanding of the information impacts, and it is difficult to completely
interpret some of the outcomes. Here we take it one step further, dividing all bidding
into four mutually exclusive categories: domestic/and non-labeled (DN),
domestic/eco-labeled (DE), imported/non-labeled (IN), and imported/eco-labeled (IE).
Table 3.7 illustrates the interactive effects of country of origin and the eco-label.
Results show that consumers are willing to pay more for an eco-label on domestic
products than the same label on imported products when public benefit information is
provided. This may indicate Chinese consumer lack of trust with the domestic
producers’ level of compliance and certifiers’ credibility. Private benefit information
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does not have a significant impact on consumers’ WTP for both domestic and
imported eco-labels.
Table 3.8 is similar to Table 3.6, but with more detailed categorization. As
expected, whether the product is domestic or imported, non-labeled products show no
positive response to public benefit information, but both domestic eco-labeled and
imported eco-labeled products receive a high premium for public benefit information.
In particular, a combination of public then private benefit information creates the
highest premium. Recalling the results from Table 3.7, Chinese consumers generally
prefer an eco-label on imported products. Surprisingly, however, we find that all
information treatments have a higher premium for domestic eco-labeled products than
imported eco-labeled products. It is not controversial to the previous results because
this is a vertical comparison, which emphasizes the positive impact of public benefit
information to domestic eco-labeled products.
A few conclusions can be drawn from the above tables. Public benefit
information has a significant impact on consumer WTP for certified products, whether
domestic or imported, and it is necessary to provide public benefit information prior to
private benefit information.
There exists a preference for certification of imported products over domestic
products, which reveals Chinese consumers’ lack of trust of certifiers’ credibility in
China, as well as the level of compliance of domestic producers.
Domestically certified products have a higher response to detailed certification
information than imported certified products, which is a positive signal for domestic
marketers and producers.
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Regression and prediction
The tables, above, provide a general understanding of how Chinese consumers view
certification information on sustainably farmed seafood. To generate more reliable
estimations and be able to make predications, a regression model is needed. A hedonic
model is adopted for this analysis.
Because this is a multiple-participant, multiple-round experiment, the bidding is
panel data. Unobserved heterogeneity of participants can be eliminated through the
within effects. The dependent variable here is the bidding price, which is consumers’
WTP. Independent variables are product attributes, information treatments and
interaction terms. Below is the model specification:
3

4

12

𝐵𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + ∑ 𝛽1𝑛 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑛 + ∑ 𝛽2𝑘 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑘 + ∑ 𝛽3𝑡 𝑅𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑡
𝑛=1

𝑘=1
3

𝑡=2

4

+ ∑ ∑ 𝛾𝑛𝑘 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑛 ∗ 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑘 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡
𝑛=1 𝑘=1

In this model, the dependent variable, 𝐵𝑖𝑡 , is the bid from individual i in round t.
𝛽0 is the constant term. Certification, Import, and Info are all binary dummy variables.
There are four information dummies that cover five treatments: basic information,
private benefit information, public benefit information, private + public benefit
information, and public + private benefit information. The time variable, 𝑅𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑡 , is
controlled for a learning effect through the experiment. Information variables are also
interacted with import and certification variables. 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is the observation-specific error
term.
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A hedonic price model provides confirmation of our previous outcomes from
average treatment effects and predicts the outcome based on information. A Hausman
test was conducted to evaluate the fixed and random effects, and results suggest a
random effects regression was more appropriate for this model. See Table 3.9 for the
coefficient estimates.
Two models are displayed in Table 3.9, one without interaction terms and one
with them. The interaction terms between product attributes and information
treatments have improved the explanatory power of the model and provided more
insightful implications for the study. Predictions were made using Model 2, and Table
3.10 was created to interpret their value.
Results in Table 3.10 are very similar to Table 3.8, which once again reinforces
the effectiveness of our regression model. Table 3.10 shows that for the DN product,
only private benefit information and private + public benefit information treatments
indicate significant differences from basic information. For the IN product, providing
private benefit information generated some negative effects. This is reasonable, since
there is no such benefit involved in this type of product. But for the DE and IE
products, public benefit information generated positive, large numbers of premiums.
Once again, providing public benefit first made a difference. Basically, the same
conclusion can be made here as in the previous section.

Conclusion and discussion
Sustainable seafood programs are not a perfect system that could solve every fishery
management issue immediately, but there is no doubt this is one of the most important
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mechanisms to slow down the degradation of wild fishery stocks and improve coastal
fishery communities. Sustainable seafood programs have evolved for about two
decades as a market-based mechanism and have successfully incentivized fishmen/fish
farmers globally to produce in a more sustainable manner. At the same time, industry
and academia have never stopped doubting program designs and actual environmental
impacts. Thus, when promoting these programs, especially in developing nations, we
need to carefully study local markets and government situations.
Historically, seafood has been a luxury product in China, and not until recently
has it become an everyday food for most consumers. As household incomes continue
to increase, average seafood consumption is predicted to reach 50 kg/year/capita.
Since China has the world’s largest population, it will consume a significant amount
of fish every year. Sustainable fisheries and aquaculture are the only ways for China to
maintain healthy wild fish stocks and ocean environment without damaging global
fisheries resources. Currently, neither China’s seafood industry nor general public has
a thorough understanding of sustainable seafood, especially sustainable aquaculture.
Urgent tasks include public education to raise consumer awareness, as well as modify
current sustainable seafood programs to fit into Chinese consumers’ everyday life.
This may be accomplished through the study of their preferences.
In this chapter, Chinese consumer preferences for sustainably farmed seafood
were studied using a sealed-bid, second-price experimental auction method. This is an
incentive-compatible experiment design aiming to elicit consumers’ true WTP.
Conclusions can be drawn as follows.
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1. Chinese consumers believe that domestic products can provide better private
benefits than imported products even without a certification, but they are willing to
pay more for certification on imported products than domestic products, which means
they have less trust in domestic producers.
2. Chinese consumers are willing to pay a premium for eco-labeled products,
especially when public benefit information is provided. Consumers can verify private
benefits simply through consumption, but they need certification to verify public
benefits on both products, since public benefits are credence attributes that are difficult
to evaluate through consumption. That is why public benefit information generates a
premium on eco-labeled products, but this is not the case for private benefit
information. Consumers still consider sustainable aquaculture certification as a pure
public benefit. Providing public benefit information can significantly increase
consumers’ WTP for eco-labeled products.
3. There exists a different marketing strategy for each type of product. For both
domestic and imported eco-labeled products, it is best to provide public and then
private benefit information, while for imported, non-labeled products, providing
private benefit information first then public benefit information will generate better
results. For domestic, non-labeled products, our results show private benefit
information will increase the consumers’ WTP. This is a debatable result, however,
since it is not reasonable for consumers to pay more for non-labeled products when
certification information is provided.
This research has resulted in some recommendations for both Chinese retailers
and government. However, the research scope is limited to downtown Xiamen City,
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which cannot represent the general public in China. Thus, retailers need to test the
preferences of consumers within their service range and decide what types of seafood
will generate the highest profit. For some retailers, even though sustainable seafood is
not the best option to maximize profit currently, it may be beneficial to consider
corporate social responsibility and the positive benefits generated by good business
practices and a strong reputation. Once the main products are determined, the types of
information consumers value and may be willing to pay more for, need to be
determined. Results from this study can be a good reference for creating corporate
marketing strategies. For the Chinese government, it is vital to rebuild consumer
confidence regarding domestic farmed seafood products. Historically, Chinese
consumers have preferred local seafood and agricultural products for both quality and
emotional reasons. However, they switched to imported products due to seriously
degraded product quality and safety concerns. Building a credible domestic
certification system that covers both private and public benefits is an urgent task at
hand. Last year Chinese authorities started to reform fisheries and the seafood industry
to ensure product quality and safety. The next step is to focus on policy enforcement
and supervision.
In the next chapter, the experimental data is used again, but consumer perceptions
of the quality, safety, and eco-friendliness of sustainably farmed seafood will be added
to the analysis in order to test their WTP for these attributes.
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Figure 3.1. An Application of Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs to Seafood

Self-actualization:
responsible
seafood

Esteem needs:
sustainable seafood
Belongingness and love
needs:
product origin of seafood

Safety needs:
seafood security, safety

Physiological needs:
seafood quality
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Gender

Table 3.1. Distribution of Participant Demographics
Frequency Percent Cumulative
Female
53
69.74
69.74
Male
23
30.26
100

Age

18–25
26–30
31–40
41–50
51–60
60+

19
27
15
9
2
4

25
35.53
19.74
11.84
2.63
5.26

25
60.53
80.26
92.11
94.74
100

Job

Housewife/husband
R&D
Sales/marketing
Student
Teacher
Officer/other

21
6
12
13
7
17

27.63
7.89
15.79
17.11
9.21
22.37

27.63
35.52
51.31
68.42
77.63
100

50
17
9

65.79
22.37
11.84

65.79
88.16
100

Sustainability
knowledge

0
1
2
3

32
30
13
1

42.11
39.47
17.11
1.32

42.11
81.58
98.68
100

Purchasing
venue

Supermarket
Wet market
Convenience store
Fishmen
Online

46
64
10
3
6

35.66
49.61
7.75
2.33
4.65

35.66
85.27
93.02
95.35
100.00

1–3
Consumption
4–8
frequency (per month)
8+
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Rd 2
DE
DN
IE
IN

Rd 3
IN
IE
DN
DE

Rd 4
IE
IN
DE
DN

Rd 5
DN
DE
IN
IE

Rd 6
DE
DN
IE
IN

Rd 7
IN
IE
DN
DE

Rd 8
IE
IN
DE
DN

Block 2 （Private benefit）
Rd 9
DN
DE
IN
IE

Rd 10
DE
DN
IE
IN

Rd 11
IN
IE
DN
DE

Rd 12
IE
IN
DE
DN

Block 3 （Private+public）

9
12
10
9

N

Block 1 （Basic information）
Block 2 （Public benefit）
Block 3 (Public+private）
Session 5
DN
DE
IN
IE
DN
DE
IN
IE
DN
DE
IN
IE
9
Session 6
DE
DN
IE
IN
DE
DN
IE
IN
DE
DN
IE
IN
10
Session 7
IN
IE
DN
DE
IN
IE
DN
DE
IN
IE
DN
DE
10
Session 8
IE
IN
DE
DN
IE
IN
DE
DN
IE
IN
DE
DN
9
Notes: DN indicates domestic/non-labeled shrimp; DE indicates domestic/eco-labeled shrimp; IN indicates imported/non-labeled shrimp; IE
indicates imported/eco-labeled shrimp. Basic information includes whether or not the shrimp is imported or eco-labeled, no detailed
information is provided. Private benefit and public benefit are both single pieces of information that state different standards of the eco-label.
Public+private and private+public are both full pieces of information, but are given in different sequences.

Session 1
Session 2
Session 3
Session 4

Rd 1
DN
DE
IN
IE

Block 1 （Basic information）

Table 3.2. Auction Experiment Design

Figure 3.2. Display Photos Used in the Experiment
Domestic and Non-labelled

Domestic and Eco-labelled

Imported and Non-labelled

Imported and Eco-labelled
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Table 3.3. Public and Private Benefit Information
1 Mangrove and Wetland Conservation: Aquaculture facilities shall
not be located in a mangrove or other wetland areas where they
displace important natural habitats. Farm operations shall not
damage wetlands, except for allowable purposes, which shall be
mitigated.
2 Effluent Management: Aquaculture facilities shall monitor their
effluents to confirm compliance with the BAP effluent water
quality criteria defined in Appendix A. Water quality
measurements taken during the audit shall meet both BAP criteria
and those of applicable government permits. Facilities shall
comply with BAP’s final criteria within five years. Water
exchange shall be limited to reduce overall environmental
impacts.
3 Soil and Water Conservation, Pond Sludge Management: Farm
construction and operations shall not cause soil and water
salinization or deplete groundwater in surrounding areas. Farms
shall properly manage and dispose of sediment from ponds,
raceways, canals, and settling basins.
Public benefit
information

4 Fishmeal and Fish Oil Conservation: Farms shall accurately
monitor feed inputs and minimize the use of fishmeal and fish oil
derived from wild fisheries
5 Stocking Sources and GMOs: Wild juveniles shall not be stocked.
Certified farms shall comply with governmental regulations
regarding the use of native and non-native species and genetically
modified aquaculture species.
6 Biodiversity and Wildlife Protection: Certified farms shall
manage physical interactions with wildlife.
7 Storage and Disposal of Farm Supplies and Waste: Fuel,
lubricants and agricultural chemicals shall be stored and disposed
of in a safe and responsible manner. Paper and plastic refuse shall
be disposed of in a prompt, sanitary, and responsible way.
Excessive accumulation of waste and/or discarded farm supplies
and equipment shall be removed and disposed of responsibly.
8 Animal Health and Welfare: Producers shall demonstrate that all
operations on farms are designed and operated with animal
welfare in mind, and maximum survival shall be sought.
Employees shall be trained to provide appropriate levels of
husbandry.
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Table 3.3. Public and Private Benefit Information (continued)
1 Chemical and Drug Management: Proactively prohibited
antibiotics, drugs, and other chemical compounds shall not be
used. Other therapeutic agents shall be used as directed on product
labels for control of diagnosed diseases or required pond
management, and not for prophylactic purposes without
veterinary oversight.
2 Microbial Sanitation, Hygiene: Human waste and untreated
animal manure shall be prevented from contaminating pond
waters. Domestic sewage shall be treated and not contaminate
surrounding areas.
3 Disease Control: Biosecurity controls shall be in place to prevent
the introduction and/or spread of disease agents and disease on the
farm. These include regular disease surveillance, sanitation of
equipment and personnel, quarantine of diseased animals, and
controlled movement of personnel and equipment. Farm staff and
visitors shall be trained in and apply biosecurity measures.
Private benefit 4 Harvest and Transport: Aquacultured products shall be harvested
and transported to processing plants or other markets in a manner
information
that maintains temperature control and prevents physical damage
or contamination. Sulphites shall be handled responsibly to
control risks to consumers and the environment.
5 Traceability: To establish product traceability, the following data
shall be recorded for each culture unit and each production cycle:
Culture unit identification number
Unit area or volume
Stocking date
Quantity of fingerlings or postlarvae stocked
Source of fingerlings or postlarvae (hatchery)
Antibiotic and drug use
Sulfite use in shrimp
Herbicide, algaecide, and other pesticide use
Manufacturer and lot number for each feed used
Harvest date and quantity
Movement document number (if applicable)
Processing plant(s) or purchaser(s) (Identify all if any harvest
quantity goes to more than one plant or purchaser)
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Variable

Table 3.4. Summary Statistics of the Main Variables
Obs. Mean
Std. Dev. Min. Max.

Bid

936

34.93536

19.74875

0

200

Domestic/non-labeled
Domestic/eco-labeled
Imported/non-labeled
Imported/eco-labeled

936
936
936
936

0.25
0.25
0.25
0.25

0.433244
0.433244
0.433244
0.433244

0
0
0
0

1
1
1
1

Basic information
Private benefit information
Public benefit information
Private+public benefit info.
Public+private benefit info.

936
936
936
936
936

0.333333
0.17094
0.162393
0.17094
0.162393

0.471657
0.376658
0.369008
0.376658
0.369008

0
0
0
0
0

1
1
1
1
1

53

54

28.91
36.67
30.25

Public benefit

Private+public

Public+private

(20.32)

(19.76)

(15.11)

(18.07)

39.87

39.1

38.45

37.49

36.36

(27.12)

(21.88)

(22.36)

(20.44)

(18.43)

9.62***

2.43

9.54***

1.67

6.54***

Difference

(3)

-7.5

-1.64

-6.4

-1.19

-6.03

t-value

(4)

22.28

36.84

23.47

35.8

29.01

(10.44)

(20.25)

(11.75)

(17.55)

(14.67)

Non-labeled

(5)

47.84

38.94

43.88

37.50

37.18

(27.48)

(21.44)

(20.63)

(20.89)

(17.49)

Eco-labeled

(6)

25.57***

2.10

20.41***

1.70

8.17***

Difference

(7)

-9.78

-0.80

-12.28

-0.74

-7.55

t-value

(8)

76

80

76

80

156

N

Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard deviations. The differences and t-values are calculated in paired t-tests. The significance levels are noted as: *
(5%), ** (1%), *** (0.1%). Basic information includes whether or not the products are imported or eco-labeled. Private benefit and public benefit are
both single pieces of information. Public+private and private+public are both full pieces of information, but given in different sequences. N is the test
group sample size.

35.81

Private benefit

(13.91)

Imported

Domestic
29.83

(2)

(1)

Basic

Information
Treatment

Table 3.5. T-test for Price Differences of Imported/Domestic and Eco-labeled/Non-labeled Products by Information Treatment
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2.75***
2.49**
3.61***
3.83**

Private benefit info

Public benefit info

Private+public benefit info

Public+private benefit info
1.67

1.10

1.04

0.83

se

-2.29

-3.30

-2.40

-3.33

t-value

3.70*

2.56**

2.28*

0.94

Premium

1.61

0.93

1.01

0.72

se

Imported

-2.30

-2.76

-2.25

-1.31

t-value

-1.89***

3.23**

-0.70

2.19**

Premium

0.52

1.16

0.66

0.85

se

Non-labeled

3.65

-2.78

1.06

-2.59

t-value

9.42***

2.94***

5.46***

1.50*

Premium

2.06

0.85

1.19

0.71

se

Eco-labeled

-4.57

-3.46

-4.60

-2.13

t-value

N

76

76

80

80

Note: All the premiums are the bidding differences between information treatment groups and the basic information control group. The differences and t-values
are calculated in paired t-tests. The significance levels are noted as * (5%), ** (1%), *** (0.1%). Basic information includes whether or not the products are
imported or eco-labeled. Private benefit and public benefit are both single pieces of information. Public+private and private+public are both full pieces of
information, but given in different sequences. N is the test group sample size.

Premium

Domestic

Treatment

Information

Table 3.6. Impact of Information on Consumer WTP by Product Category
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35.58

20.05

35.80

19.08

Private benefit

Public benefit

Private+public

Public+private

(7.87)

(20.15)

(7.33)

(17.11)

(12.85)

41.42

37.55

37.76

36.05

33.06

(22.77)

(19.58)

(15.75)

(19.20)

(14.25)

DE

(2)

22.34***

1.75

17.71***

0.47

6.47***

Difference

(3)

-6.78

-0.46

-7.86

-0.15

-4.99

t-value

(4)

25.47

37.88

26.89

36.02

31.43

(11.74)

(20.56)

(14.22)

(18.19)

(16.01)

IN

(5)

54.26

40.33

50.00

38.95

41.29

(30.45)

(23.32)

(23.18)

(22.60)

(19.45)

IE

(6)

28.79***

2.45*

23.11***

2.93

9.87***

Difference

(7)

-7.13

-0.67

-9.66

-0.88

-5.74

t-value

(8)

38

40

38

40

78

N

Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard deviations. The differences and t-values are calculated in paired t-tests. The significance levels are noted as: * (5%),
** (1%), *** (0.1%). DN indicates domestic/non-labeled shrimp; DE indicates domestic/eco-labeled shrimp; IN indicates imported/non-labeled shrimp; IE
indicates imported/eco-labeled shrimp. Basic information includes whether or not the products are imported or eco-labeled. Private benefit and public benefit are
both single pieces of information. Public+private and private+public are both full pieces information, but given in different sequences. N is the test group sample
size.

26.59

DN

Treatment

Basic

(1)

Information

Table 3.7. T-test for Price Premium of an Eco-label by Country of Origin and Information Treatment (RMB)
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3.60**
-0.87
3.82
-1.84**

Private benefit info

Public benefit info

Private+public benefit info

Public+private benefit info
0.66

2.00

0.79

1.35

se

2.80

-1.92

1.10

-2.67

t-value

9.50***

3.40***

5.84***

1.90*

Premium

3.03

0.94

1.77

0.95

se

DE

-3.14

-3.63

-3.31

-1.99

t-value

-1.95*

2.64*

-0.53

0.79

Premium

0.81

1.21

1.07

1.00

se

IN

2.40

-2.18

0.49

-0.79

t-value

9.34***

2.48

5.08***

1.10

Premium

2.84

1.42

1.61

1.05

se

IE

-3.29

-1.74

-3.16

-1.05

t-value

38

40

38

40

N

Note: All premiums are the bidding differences between information treatment groups and basic information control group. The differences and t-values are calculated
in paired t-tests. The significance level are noted as: * (5%), ** (1%), *** (0.1%). DN indicates domestic/non-labeled shrimp; DE indicates domestic/eco-labeled
shrimp; IN indicates imported/non-labeled shrimp; IE indicates imported/eco-labeled shrimp. Basic information includes whether or not the products are imported or
eco-labeled. Private benefit and public benefit are both single pieces of information. Public+private and private+public are both full pieces of information, but given in
different sequences. N is the test group sample size.

Premium

Information Treatment

DN

Table 3.8. T-test for Price Premium for Information by Product Category

Table 3.9. Coefficient Estimates
Bidding (RMB: yuan)
(1)
(2)

Variable
Constant
Domestic & eco-labeled (DE, yes=1, otherwise=0)
Imported & non-labeled (IN, yes=1, otherwise=0)
Imported & eco-labeled (IE, yes=1, otherwise=0)
Only private benefit info (yes=1, otherwise=0)
Only public benefit info (yes=1, otherwise=0)
Private then public benefit info (yes=1, otherwise=0)
Public then private benefit info (yes=1, otherwise=0)
DE * private benefit info
IN * private benefit info
IE * private benefit info
DE * public benefit info
IN * public benefit info
IE* public benefit info
DE * Private then public benefit info
IN * Private then public benefit info
IE * Private then public benefit info
DE * Public then private benefit info
IN* Public then private benefit info
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20.788***
(2.232)
9.239***
(1.073)
4.009***
(1.073)
16.966***
(1.071)
16.044***
(2.048)
16.045***
(2.068)
17.884***
(2.048)
18.029***
(2.068)

20.788***
(2.232)
6.593***
(1.694)
4.637***
(1.694)
14.763***
(1.692)
21.243***
(2.608)
8.883***
(2.634)
21.971***
(2.608)
8.490***
(2.634)
–5.690*
(2.909)
–4.522
(2.909)
–11.136***
(2.906)
11.075***
(2.957)
2.163
(2.957)
15.184***
(2.955)
–4.299
(2.909)
–2.844
(2.909)
–9.836***
(2.906)
15.712***
(2.957)
1.721
(2.957)

Table 3.9. Coefficient Estimates (continued)
IE* Public then private benefit info

Observations
Number of id
Wald chi-square statistics

933
78
308.29

Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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20.421***
(2.955)
933
78
498.94
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0.8

0.4

0.66

0.32

se

0.34

-5.82

-1.06

-6.51

t-value

11.07***

1.91***

7.41***

0.41

Premium

0.82

0.38

0.69

0.33

se

DE

-13.49

-5.06

-10.77

-1.24

t-value

-0.38

1.15**

1.04

-0.7*

Premium

0.82

0.39

0.69

0.34

se

IN

0.46

-2.97

-1.51

2.04

t-value

10.91***

0.99

6.65***

-0.39

Premium

0.8

0.39

0.66

0.32

se

IE

-13.67

-2.54

-10.06

1.22

t-value

38

40

38

40

N

Note: All the premiums are the difference between information treatment groups and basic information control group using predicted bidding from the
regression model. The differences and t-values are calculated in paired t-tests. The significance level are noted as: * (5%), ** (1%), *** (0.1%). DN indicates
domestic/non-labeled shrimp; DE indicates domestic/eco-labeled shrimp; IN indicates imported/non-labeled shrimp; IE indicates imported/eco-labeled
shrimp. Basic information includes whether or not the products are imported or eco-labeled. Private benefit and public benefit are both single pieces of
information. Public+private and private+public are both full pieces of information, but given in different sequences. N is the test group sample size.

-0.28

Public+private benefit info

0.7

Public benefit info
2.34***

2.11***

Private benefit info

Private+public benefit info

Premium

Information Treatment

DN

Table 3.10. T-test for Price Premium for Information by Product Category Using Predicted Outcomes

CHAPTER 4

ESTIMATION OF CHINESE CONSUMER WILLINGNESS TO PAY FOR THE
QUALITY, SAFETY AND ECO-FRIENDLINESS OF SUSTAINABLY FARMED
SEAFOOD

Introduction
In the previous chapters, we discussed the impact of information on the price for
sustainably farmed seafood. Regardless if market data or experiment data were used,
we were only able to evaluate explicitly revealed seafood attributes, such as country of
origin and certification, and were unsure to what extent consumers understood the
information and how they used it for decision making. Lusk and his colleagues
conducted two non-hypothetical choice experiments and one non-hypothetical
experimental auction to demonstrate the importance of incorporating consumers’
subjective perceptions when testing their food preferences (Lusk and Schroeder 2004;
Lusk, Feldkamp, and Schroeder 2004; Lusk, Schroeder, and Tonsor 2014). Usually
food attributes are a mixture of basic elements; thus, it is not easy to evaluate them
directly. For example the “imported” attribute might be a representation of both
quality and safety for Chinese consumers, and the “eco-label” attribute could be a
mixture of quality, safety, and eco-friendliness. Previously, we estimated the value of
“imported” and “eco-label” attributes, but could not evaluate consumers’ WTP for
quality, safety, and eco-friendliness because they were not expressed explicitly. In this
chapter, we assume that product quality, safety, and eco-friendliness are three basic

61

components of consumers’ utility function. Product quality and safety have always
been primary attributes in consumer preference studies (Zeithaml 1988; Grunert 2002;
Fonner and Sylvia 2015; Han and Bi 2016). Credence attributes, like eco-friendliness,
pique researchers’ interest, as consumer awareness has steadily increased over the past
decade (Brécard et al. 2012; Xu et al. 2012; Sogn-Grundvåg, Larsen, and Young
2014; Blomquist, Bartolino, and Waldo 2015). Other factors that might affect
consumer preferences, such as workers’ welfare, gender equality, and animal welfare,
are not considered explicitly in this research. Only with a deeper understanding of
consumer preferences of these basic elements could we develop more efficient and
effective marketing strategies to capture the optimal value for sustainably farmed
seafood.
Following previous experimental auctions, we asked participants to report their
perceptions of product quality, safety, and eco-friendliness at the end of each round. A
panel data set was constructed through the multiple-round experiment. Using a
random-effects GLS regression model, regression results found out that for 500 grams
of medium-size frozen raw white-leg shrimp, consumers with a mixed level of
information generally were willing to pay 30.54 yuan for guaranteed good quality,
19.84 yuan for guaranteed health safety, 12.16 yuan for eco-friendliness, and 3.53
yuan for other guaranteed attributes. Taking the information treatments into
consideration, with only basic information consumers tend to pay more for guaranteed
quality. Once they received private and public benefit information, they reallocated a
portion of payment from quality to safety and eco-friendliness, increasing their total
WTP. Results from this study could be used as marketing strategies for sustainable
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seafood, as well as government policy making. The remainder of this chapter is
arranged as following. In next section, we discuss the data acquired from the previous
experiment. After that, the model specification and estimation results are reported.
Finally, conclusions are presented.

Data description
Consumer perception data and bidding information were collected in the experiment.
The procedure is identical to the auctions in Chapter 3. The questions are: “To what
extent (

%) do you believe that this product is of 100% quality/safety/eco-

friendliness?” Here, no specific explanation or definition of the quality, safety, and
eco-friendliness was provided. Instead, a few examples were given to guide them
while building their evaluation system based on their knowledge and consumption
experiences. For instance, participants were told that quality indicators could be
seafood freshness, taste, or presentation; indicators of safety could be the level of
antibiotic use or heavy metal residues; indicators for eco-friendliness could be the
impact on coastal wetlands or the use of fishmeal that contains wild fish. Thus, the
questions were reformed as: “To what extent do you believe that this shrimp is fresh
enough to make you 100% satisfied?” “To what extent do you believe that the heavy
metal level within this shrimp makes you not to worry about the negative health
impact by consuming it?” “To what extent do you believe that farming this shrimp
will not cause damage the wetland in its surroundings?”
Recalling the research design in Chapter 3, 8 sessions of sealed-bid, second-price
auctions were conducted, with 12 rounds in each session. To enlarge the sample size
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and gain better estimation results, three additional sessions, conducted in Beijing, were
added to the data set. Due to time constraints, only three of eight sessions were
finished as planned, but the additional data were very helpful for our analysis. The
three sessions doubled our observations for the basic information, private benefit
information, and private + public benefit information treatment groups. A session
started round 1 with basic information on country of origin and certification, then
added different information to participants every four rounds. During sessions 1 to 4,
basic information appeared from rounds 1 to round 4. Then private benefit information
was then provided from rounds 5 to 9, and public benefit information was added in the
last four rounds. In sessions 5 to 8 the experiment followed the same logic, but
reversed the order of private benefit information and public benefit information.
Beijing sessions are number sessions 9, 10, and 11, which are repetitions of session 1,
2, and 3. Participant perceptions of quality, safety, and eco-friendliness for each round
were collected after bidding was complete. Table 4.1 shows the summary statistics of
consumer bids and perceptions of product quality, safety, and eco-friendliness. In
general people have similar perceptions about seafood quality and safety, but a slightly
lower confidence in eco-friendliness. The average bid of these 11 sessions is about 38
yuan, and consumers believe that seafood in the market have only 65% chance to
satisfy them in quality and safety, only 50% chance to be eco-friendly. In addition to
Table 4.1, Figure 4.1 summarizes consumer bids and perceptions of product quality,
safety, and eco-friendliness by product type and information treatment. This summary
indicates that for all four types of products, consumers have similar perceptions about
quality and safety, both of which are much higher than their perception of eco-
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friendliness. This is expected, as seafood eco-friendliness is a new concept in China
that has not been acknowledged and accepted by general public. For information
treatment effects, consumers should reevaluate their perceptions of non-labeled
products if they receive additional certification information; for eco-labeled products,
private benefit information is likely to increase their perceptions of quality and safety,
and public benefit information should increase their perception in eco-friendliness.
Figure 4.1 shows that for both domestic/non-labeled and imported/non-labeled
products, providing public benefit information has a negative impact on perceptions
for all three factors, but providing private benefit information can increase consumer
perceptions. For eco-labeled products, private benefit information has no positive
impact, but public benefit information increases consumers’ perceptions in all three
areas. For all products, it is the first piece of information that matters most, as the
second piece does not add too much to consumer opinion. Figure 4.1 also shows that
consumers’ bids are correlated with their perceptions, which confirms the original
hypothesis. The next step is to calculate consumers’ WTP for quality, safety, and ecofriendliness.

Model specification and estimation
Following Lusk, Schroeder, and Tonsor (2014), a random expected utility model is
used to evaluate consumers’ expected utility for different types of farmed seafood
products:
𝑥

𝐸𝑈𝑖𝑘 = ∑𝐽𝑗=1 𝑝𝑖𝑘𝑗 𝑈(𝑥𝑗 ) + 𝛼𝑦 + 𝛾𝑘 .
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(1)

𝐸𝑈𝑖𝑘 is the expected utility of individual i for product k, where k is one of the four
types of seafood: domestic/non-labeled (DN), domestic/eco-labeled (DE),
imported/non-labeled (IN), and imported/eco-labeled (IE). DN is used as the basic
group.
𝑥

𝑝𝑖𝑘𝑗 is the perception of individual i for attribute 𝑥𝑗 of product k, where 𝑥𝑗 can be
quality, safety, or eco-friendliness. 𝑈(𝑥𝑗 ) is the the utility of attribute 𝑥𝑗 , y is the
income variable, and 𝛼 is the marginal utility of income. 𝛾𝑘 is the subject invariant
constant for product k. For example, 𝛾𝐼𝐸 is the utility that the consumer gains from
imported/eco-labeled seafood not accounted for by attribute quality, safety, or ecofriendliness. From equation (1), two utility functions of DN and DE are formed as
follows:
𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦

𝐸𝑈𝑖 𝐷𝑁 = 𝑝𝑖 𝐷𝑁

𝑠𝑎𝑓𝑒𝑡𝑦

𝑈(𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦) + 𝑝𝑖 𝐷𝑁

𝑈(𝑠𝑎𝑓𝑒𝑡𝑦) + 𝑝𝑖𝑒𝑐𝑜
𝐷𝑁 𝑈(𝑒𝑐𝑜) + 𝛼𝑦 + 𝛾𝐷𝑁
(2)

𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦

𝐸𝑈𝑖 𝐷𝐸 = 𝑝𝑖 𝐷𝐸

𝑠𝑎𝑓𝑒𝑡𝑦

𝑈(𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦) + 𝑝𝑖 𝐷𝐸

𝑈(𝑠𝑎𝑓𝑒𝑡𝑦) + 𝑝𝑖𝑒𝑐𝑜
𝐷𝐸 𝑈(𝑒𝑐𝑜) + 𝛼𝑦 + 𝛾𝐷𝐸 .
(3)

Suppose consumer i is willing to pay ∆𝑊𝑇𝑃𝑖 𝐷𝐸→𝐷𝑁 to switch from DN to DE,
then the equation to connect the two functions above is:
𝐸𝑈𝑖 𝐷𝐸 = 𝐸𝑈𝑖 𝐷𝑁 + 𝛼∆𝑊𝑇𝑃𝑖 𝐷𝐸→𝐷𝑁 .

(4)

Substituting equations (2) and (3) into (4) and rearranging gives the final
regression model:
∆𝑊𝑇𝑃𝑖 𝐷𝑁→𝑘 =

𝑈(𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦) 𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑈(𝑠𝑎𝑓𝑒𝑡𝑦) 𝑠𝑎𝑓𝑒𝑡𝑦 𝑈(𝑒𝑐𝑜) 𝑒𝑐𝑜
∆𝑝𝑖 𝐷𝑁→𝑘 +
∆𝑝𝑖 𝐷𝑁→𝑘 +
∆𝑝𝑖 𝐷𝑁→𝑘
𝛼
𝛼
𝛼

+

∆𝛾𝐷𝑁→𝑘
𝛼
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K is either product DE, IN, or IE. ∆𝑊𝑇𝑃𝑖 𝐷𝑁→𝑘 is the bid difference of individual
𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦

i between product DN and product k from the auction. ∆𝑝𝑖 𝐷𝑁→𝑘 is the difference of
𝑠𝑎𝑓𝑒𝑡𝑦

quality perception of individual i between product DN and k. ∆𝑝𝑖 𝑘→𝐷𝑁 is the
difference of safety perception of individual i between product DN and k. ∆𝑝𝑖𝑒𝑐𝑜
𝐷𝑁→𝑘 is
the difference of the eco-friendliness perception of individual i between product DN
and k. The coefficients of

𝑈(𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦) 𝑈(𝑠𝑎𝑓𝑒𝑡𝑦) 𝑈(𝑒𝑐𝑜)
𝛼

,

,

𝛼

𝛼

, and

(𝛾𝑘 −𝛾𝐷𝑁 )
𝛼

are the marginal

utilities of income; namely, the WTP for quality, safety, eco-friendliness, and other
attributes not accounted for by the previous three.
The original data were reformed into new panel data according to the structure of
the regression model. For each individual, their bids and perceptions of DE, IN, and IE
products are deducted by those of the DN products. A random-effects panel data
regression was suggested by Hausman test to estimate the coefficients.

Estimation results
Table 4.2 summarizes six different regressions by information treatment. In Column
(1), all data were pooled by consumer preferences with mixed levels of information.
Results suggest that for 500 grams of medium-size, frozen raw white-leg shrimp,
consumers are willing to pay 30.54 yuan for guaranteed good quality, 19.84 yuan for
guaranteed health safety, 12.16 yuan for eco-friendliness, and 3.53 yuan for all other
guaranteed attributes. This means that if there is a shrimp product with 100%
assurance of good quality, health safety, and eco-friendliness, consumers are willing to
pay about 66 yuan; the maximum value for this type of shrimp. Shrimp with other
sizes or product forms may have different values, but consumers allocate their WTP at
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the same ratio among these attributes which is about 46, 30, 18, and 6%, respectively.
This fits the previous understanding of consumer preferences according to the
Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs: Quality comes first as the basic food attribute for
physiological needs; safety comes second to satisfy consumer security or health needs,
and finally eco-friendliness works to fulfill the need for self-actualization.
Columns (2) to (7) are subsamples of the pooled data under different information
scenarios. There is an observed value shifting among three factors when different
information is provided. Column (2) represents the basic information scenario where
consumers are WTP for 38.94 yuan, on average, for guaranteed quality of a shrimp
product, nothing for guaranteed safety, and 10.1 yuan for eco-friendliness. All other
factors contribute 3.44 yuan. Information for this subsample is similar to most Chinese
consumers’ knowledge level. When evaluating seafood with country of origin and
eco-label information only, they tend to pay more when retailers guarantee higher
quality. They choose not to believe the health safety guarantee because trust was
broken after a few food safety incidents occurred. They are willing to pay a small
amount for the eco-friendliness when it’s guaranteed. Eco-friendliness is different
from safety, because it is impossible to test and no negative incidents have occurred in
China. Thus, consumers may choose to believe it. When private benefit information
was provided (Column 3), consumers gained understanding of certification standards
that could apply to both quality and health safety. Thus, WTP for guaranteed quality
stays almost the same; but WTP for guaranteed safety increases significantly to 30.7
yuan. This change indicates the high demand for food safety, which would have been
ignored if no private benefit information was provided. WTP for eco-friendliness is
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not significant. When public benefit information was added to private benefit
information (Column 5), all three attributes are significant and positive. Total WTP
remains at the same level as private benefit information, but the distribution changes
slightly. Because consumers received more information about environmental
protection from the certified farm, they put some resources from quality and safety
into eco-friendliness.
For the other set of information treatments, public benefit information was
provided first (Column 4), then private benefit information was added (Column 6).
However, the results were not as significant as the first set. It could be caused by the
small sample size—there are only 38 participants compared to 70 in the first set. The
last column is the full information treatment, which is a pool of Columns (6) and (7).
Outcomes show that consumers pay attention to all three factors, but they lower the
weight on quality and allocate more resources to safety and eco-friendliness due to
two pieces of additional information.
As a result of this data, some marketing suggestions were formed for promoting
sustainably farmed seafood in China. First, when sustainably farmed seafood enters a
new market in a developing country like China, it will be met by consumers with very
limited seafood sustainability knowledge, as shown in the demographic survey in
Chapter 3. This is because they have not been exposed to sustainable seafood
certification standards or benefits guaranteed by the eco-label. More familiar
information is mandated country of origin and production method information printed
on the sales label in the grocery store. This is similar to our basic information scenario.
An average Chinese retailer would not invest resources to provide additional
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information to educate consumers on food safety and eco-friendliness. They are
correct, since a large portion of consumer WTP is proven spending on the guaranteed
quality. The most effective marketing strategy for retailers is to convince their
customers of their products’ quality. However they are not able to predict neither the
value of information nor the consumers’ true WTP. When consumers are provided full
information about sustainable aquaculture certification and promised guaranteed
attributes, their hidden WTP for health, safety and eco-friendliness will be extracted,
and the total WTP for the product will be much higher than with basic information
only. To summarize, it is a two-step solution. First, educate consumers regarding
sustainable aquaculture certification, preferably private benefit information first, then
public benefit information. Second, guarantee the consumer a high percentage of one
or a few attributes, since there is no single product that can guarantee 100% quality,
safety, and eco-friendliness simultaneously. A certified aquaculture product,
depending on what kind of certification it acquires, usually maintains a high level of
one or a few attributes. For example, ASC certification has very stringent
requirements for all three attributes; BAP certification has less stringent standards, but
covers all the attributes; the Chinese local Non-harmless Agriculture certification
focuses more on food safety; and Organic certification may advertise itself as highquality and eco-friendly. Finally, retailers should strive to avoid seafood fraud,
whether intentional or accidental, as it is extremely difficult to rebuild Chinese
consumers’ trust in food safety.

Conclusion
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Promotion of sustainable seafood has been slow in the Chinese market, despite
constant industry efforts. Consumers and retailers are realizing the importance of
sustainable seafood and are willing to play a role, but on the demand side, consumers
have not received useful information when faced with a decision. On the supply end,
retailers did not have full understanding of consumer preferences, such as how they
allocate their money toward seafood attributes. Thus, the typical marketing strategy
still focuses on quality attributes like freshness and taste, which falls short of
developing the full value of sustainably farmed seafood. Gradually retailers lose
interest in and incentives to sell sustainable seafood, because no or very limited profit
is generated.
This study aims to provide scientific suggestions for promoting sustainable
seafood in China based on consumer preference analysis. Built upon a popular
experimental auction method, it incorporates consumers’ subjective perceptions on
basic seafood attributes in order to break down their WTP to the principal level.
Multiple information treatments are designed to obtain more detailed solutions. A
random expected utility model was used to construct the regression model, and the
results indicate that with only basic information, such as country of origin and ecolabeling, consumers are willing to pay about 53 yuan (about US $8) for 500 grams of
farmed shrimp with a 100% guarantee of quality, safety, and eco-friendliness.
Seventy-three percent of the WTP is due to the guaranteed quality, 0% for safety, and
18% for eco-friendliness. Providing private benefit information of certification
increases consumers’ total WTP to 69 yuan (about US $10). Most of this comes from
guaranteed safety. Lastly, providing additional information of public benefit does not
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increase consumers’ total WTP, but successfully reallocates payment from quality to
safety and eco-friendliness, with a 20% increase for eco-friendliness. In sum, for
retailers interested in sustainably farmed seafood, it is essential to understand the
requirement levels of quality, safety, and eco-friendliness provided by different
seafood certification programs. They can then choose the appropriate products
according to corporate short- and long-term seafood marketing objectives and goals.
Based on these products, they then need to make a commitment to one or a few of the
attributes. Finally, they need to educate their consumers with the private and public
benefit information about the different sustainable seafood certifications.
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Table 4.1 Summary Statistics of Main Variables
Variable

Obs

Mean

Std. Dev.

Min

Max

Bid

1296

37.594

21.345

0

200

Quality perception

1296

0.649

0.203

0.05

1

Safety perception
Eco-friendliness
perception

1296

0.641

0.224

0.05

1

1296

0.536

0.263

0

1
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Figure 4.1. Summary of Consumers' Perceptions and Bids
by Product Type and Information
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Notes: DN indicates domestic/non-labeled shrimp; DE indicates domestic/eco-labeled shrimp; IN
indicates imported/non-labeled shrimp; IE indicates imported/eco-labeled shrimp. Basic information
includes whether or not the products are imported or eco-labeled. Private benefit and public benefit are
both single pieces of information. Public+private and private+public are both full pieces information,
but given in different sequences. The unit for perceptions is percentage, and the unit for bid is the
Chinese yuan.
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Table 4.2. Consumer WTP for Quality, Safety, and Eco-friendliness by Information Treatment
(1) Pooled

(2) Basic

(3) Private

(5) Pri+Pub

(6) Pub+Pri

(7) Full

Δ(Bid)

VARIABLES
Δ(Quality)

(4) Public

30.536***

38.937***

35.081***

40.401***

23.827**

33.899**

24.185***

(3.608)

(6.776)

(7.721)

(12.962)

(11.122)

(13.166)

(8.504)

19.839***

6.771

30.704***

4.671

27.326**

19.496*

21.382**

(3.465)

(6.142)

(8.992)

(10.983)

(11.857)

(11.302)

(8.696)

12.160***

10.100**

1.339

8.079

14.956*

2.096

13.354**

(2.154)

(4.611)

(7.177)

(5.976)

(8.180)

(5.175)

(5.458)

3.531***

3.437***

3.315***

3.029**

4.889***

3.363**

6.217***

(0.331)

(0.509)

(0.564)

(1.212)

(0.739)

(1.662)

(1.470)

Observations

1,296

432

280

152

280

152

324

R-squared

0.542

0.478

0.675

0.427

0.652

0.376

0.465

Δ (Safety)

Δ (Eco)

Constant

N of subject
108
108
70
38
70
38
108
Notes: This is a summation of six individual regressions of consumer bidding differences and their perception
difference of quality, safety, and eco-friendliness under various information treatments. Column (1) uses the pooled
data of all information treatments. Basic information includes: country of origin and certification, no detailed
information is provided. Private benefit and public benefit are both single pieces of information that state different
standards of the eco-label. Public+private and private+public are both full pieces information, but given in different
sequences. The coefficients represent consumer WTP for quality, safety, and eco-friendliness. Standard errors in
parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS

This paper focuses on the sustainably farmed seafood market in China, using both
real market data and non-hypothetical experimental auction data to evaluate the impact
of country of origin, eco-label, and certification standard information on consumer
preferences. By incorporating consumers’ subjective perceptions of quality, safety,
and eco-friendliness, we succeed in determining consumer WTP for products into their
WTP for basic product attributes. Research findings can be used to assist retailers in
designing marketing strategies. This can also provide policy implications for
governmental agencies in fishery and food industries.
The first study takes advantage of the well-developed online retail market in
China and creates a data set consisting of weekly price and product characteristic
information. A log-linear regression suggests that seafood safety is the biggest concern
of Chinese consumers, while an eco-label does not have a positive influence. When
there is no safety information, there are 6–14% premiums for imported over domestic
shrimp. For domestic shrimp, there is a 36% premium with safety information, while
safety information does not generate a premium for imported products. Results
indicate the importance of providing a safety guarantee for domestic shrimp. Without
safety information, consumers would rather spend more on imported products.
Our second study uses an experimental auction method and adds private benefit
and public benefit information from certification standards into the experiment in
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order to simulate different market scenarios. Consumer WTP for product attributes
tested in this study should be more accurate and reliable since we can control how they
receive information and ensure they consider it when making decisions. A randomeffects panel data regression suggests that for eco-labeled products, domestic or
imported, it is best to provide public and then private benefit information. While for
imported/non-labeled products, providing private benefit information first then public
benefit information will lead to higher prices. For domestic/non-labeled products, our
results show private benefit information will increase the consumer WTP. This is still
a debatable result, since it is not reasonable for consumers to pay more for non-labeled
products when they have certification information.
The third study is the continuation of the experiment. We incorporate consumers’
subjective perceptions of product quality, safety, and eco-friendliness into the analysis
to provide a more detailed understanding of their preferences. The regression model is
built on a random expected utility model. By estimating the effects of consumer
perception variations in those three basic attributes on their bidding variations, we
obtained the marginal utility on income that consumers place on each attribute—WTP
for product quality, safety, and eco-friendliness. Results indicate that with only basic
information of country of origin and eco-labeling, consumers are willing to pay about
53 yuan for 500 grams of farmed shrimp with a 100% guarantee of quality, safety, and
eco-friendliness. Seventy-three percent of their WTP is due to guaranteed quality, 0%
for safety, and 18% for eco-friendliness. Recalling our first study of the online retail
market, consumers received only basic information. The average price was 57 yuan
per 500 grams, which is surprisingly similar to our predicted result. Providing private
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benefit information of certification increases consumer total WTP to 69 yuan (about
US $10). Most of this comes from the payment for guaranteed safety. Lastly,
providing additional information of public benefit does not increase consumers’ total
WTP, but successfully reallocates the payment from quality to safety and ecofriendliness, with a 20% increase for eco-friendliness.
Combining the three studies, we can draw the following conclusions. Imported
seafood is the Chinese consumers’ first choice when there is no safety information.
Guaranteed safety can generate a high premium on domestic seafood, but not
imported. An eco-label does not generate a price premium in the current market, but
consumers are willing to pay for it as long as they are educated with the public benefit
information of the sustainable certification. Full certification information can
significantly increase consumer WTP for sustainably farmed seafood, especially for
safety and eco-friendliness. In sum, this study confirms the great potential of the
sustainably farmed seafood market in China. Seafood producers and retailers should
join sustainable seafood programs based on their own needs, but most importantly
educate their consumers about the private and public benefits they can enjoy through
consumption of sustainably farmed seafood products.
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